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THROUGH A GLASS, DARKLY
clar•i•ty '\ 'klar- t-e '\ n [ME clarite, fr. L claritat-claritas, fr. clarus]: the quality
or state of being clear.

In New York Times v. Sullivan,' the U.S. Supreme Court set
forth the standard of proof required of a public official in a defamation action. Actual malice, the Court stated, must be demonstrated
with "convincing clarity." Ten years later, in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc. ,z the Court described the same standard, but with
slightly different terminology-recovery by a public official would
be permitted only on a showing of "clear and convincing proof" of
malice.
During the past dozen years many courts-state and federalhave applied the New York Times and Gertz standard (some even
noting that "clear and convincing" and "convincing clarity" are essentially interchangeable terms), but two courts-the Vermont and
Hawaii Supreme Courts-have synthesized the variant descriptions
into a remarkably redundant hybrid. Actual malice, both courts
have declared, must be proved with "clear and convincing clarity."3
Again during the last term the Supreme Court reviewed the
Times/Gertz standard. In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,4 it indicated that "clear and convincing" and "convincing clarity" were
one and the same. And once again another court took the next step.
Recently, in Ashby v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. ,s a federal appellate court confronted the "actual malice" standard and revived the
Vermont/Hawaii synthesis. Judge Krupansky cited Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby for the principle that "the trial court must determine
if the plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the plaintiff had demonstrated actual malice with clear and convincing clarity."
By now it should be clearly and unambiguously clear: proof of
malice with muddy, murky or turbid clarity is insufficient. ThereI. 376 u.s. 254, 280, 285-86 (1964).
2. 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
3. Burns v. Times Argus Ass'n, Inc., 139 Vt. 381, 388, 430 A.2d 773, 777 (1981); Fong
v. Merena, 66 Hawaii 72, 74, 655 P.2d 875, 876 (1982).
4. 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2512 (1986).
5. 802 F.2d 856, 860 (6th Cir. 1986).
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quirement of proof by "clear clarity" is-according to the Sixth Circuit-the law of the land.
Thomas A. Woxland6
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